

ALTitudeTM Summer 2026

Your quarterly guide to the world of alternative investing

Featured article

Blue skies for hedge funds: How Silver Point turns volatility into opportunity

Page 7



Also in this issue:

- 1 The state of alternatives in U.S. wealth management
- 14 The role of private markets in modern portfolio construction
- 18 Manager profile: Carlyle's Peter Mackie

BMO



Global Asset Management

The state of alternatives in U.S. wealth management

The adoption of private market investments among wealth clients in the United States has outpaced that of their Canadian counterparts. What can Advisors and clients north of the border learn from the increasing integration of alternatives into Americans' portfolios? BMO Global Asset Management's Sarah Banks sits down with EQT's Michael Stimmel to find out.

Authors: Michael Stimmel | Associate Director, EQT
Sarah Banks | Senior Associate, Alternatives, BMO Global Asset Management

Sarah Banks (SB) Peter Aliprantis, EQT Partner and Head of Private Wealth Americas, recently pointed out that the vast majority of companies generating over US\$100 million in revenue globally are private: around 90% in the Americas, 95% in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA), and 85% in Asia.¹ What does this mean for a portfolio that doesn't include private markets today?

Michael Stimmel (MS) That's a great question. Setting returns to one side—because they aren't always guaranteed—I think it's more a question of access and diversification. The perception that public markets inherently provide diversification is becoming increasingly outdated. A few statistics really drive that point home. Currently, around 40% of the S&P 500's market capitalization lies in just 10 companies.² The public universe has also continued to shrink over the past thirty years; in the mid-1990s, there were upwards of 8,000 publicly traded companies, but now, there are closer to 4,000.³ So, not only is the universe of investable companies getting smaller, but public markets are becoming more concentrated and, as a result, increasingly correlated as well.

From a returns perspective, let's also consider that private markets have evolved to provide companies with significantly greater access to capital outside the public markets. This means that many companies are waiting longer to go public—if they do so at all—and a lot of the growth curve is happening while they remain private. That's a dynamic we've seen recently with some blockbuster initial public offerings (IPOs), like SpaceX's recent listing and the upcoming OpenAI and Anthropic offerings.

Lastly, let's look at access, using Europe as an example. European public markets are dominated by the Financials and Industrials sectors, while Technology is less than 10% in terms of market composition.⁴ That's a sharp contrast to the United States, where Technology companies are dominant. Private markets can help fill that gap by giving investors access to some of Europe's most innovative and fastest-growing companies that simply aren't available through traditional public markets.

SB Building on that, we've seen a large uptick in investment in private markets in Canadian portfolios, but there is still room to grow. How did private markets in the United States go from being a niche allocation that firms treated as an afterthought to something every large wealth firm now wants real capacity in?

MS In many ways, the surge we've seen in the adoption of private markets is less about new demand and more about the infrastructure and operational foundation being available to help Advisors integrate them into client portfolios. The various segments of private markets—private equity, private credit, infrastructure, and real estate—are not new asset classes. Rather, they have historically been hard to access, hard to implement, and hard to scale.

A big evolution that has led to this increase in adoption is the advent of evergreen structures. Evergreens have solved many of the historical pain points for Advisors and clients alike—higher minimums (in the U.S., this has traditionally been \$250,000), capital calls, and multi-year deployment periods. With drawdown

“The public universe has also continued to shrink over the past thirty years; in the mid-1990s, there were upwards of 8,000 publicly traded companies, but now, there are closer to 4,000.”³

funds, Advisors have to continuously evaluate managers, underwrite funds, and manage liquidity across several different investments. With evergreens, on the other hand, clients are now able to access diversified private markets portfolios instantly and at lower minimums, all while maintaining the exposure through single, ongoing allocations rather than a rotating set of commitments.

There is also an element of competitiveness—firms recognize the advantages of this growing asset class, and they know that if they're not offering it to Advisors and clients, somebody else will.

SB From where you sit, what are the sub-asset classes that Advisors are leaning into most, and which are still a harder sell?

MS Both at EQT and broadly across the private markets space, infrastructure is really having its moment. Together, the artificial intelligence (AI) revolution, the energy transition, and the reorienting of global supply chains

“Historically, infrastructure was viewed as a fairly sleepy, defensive asset class, one mostly associated with income and inflation protection. Today, that view is changing.”

are driving a ‘capital expenditures (capex) supercycle’ across every major market. Infrastructure is benefitting from this supercycle, with categories including digital, energy, environmental, and transportation & logistics all involved.

The other piece of this is that investors are starting to think about the asset class very differently. Historically, infrastructure was viewed as a fairly sleepy, defensive asset class, one mostly associated with income and inflation protection. Today, that view is changing. Increasingly, investors are recognizing that certain areas of infrastructure are tied to powerful long-term growth trends. As a result, infrastructure is increasingly being viewed as part of the growth side of a portfolio, but with the added benefit of the downside protection that comes from owning real assets.

An asset that has been challenged recently is real estate. Not only was it hit hard by the rising interest rate environment, but the office category in particular struggled coming out of COVID. I think that had a contagion

effect on the asset class as a whole. At the same time, attractive yields in private credit gave investors another place to put capital, which pulled some attention away from real estate. Now, though, the winds are starting to shift, in part because some of the same themes I mentioned earlier—AI-driven investment and the reshaping of global supply chains—are creating real demand for certain types of real estate, particularly industrial assets. At the same time, investors are increasingly looking for areas of the market that may be more insulated from AI-related disruption, and that naturally brings real assets back into focus.

SB You mentioned the changing definition of infrastructure. Relatedly, how can Advisors and clients actually get educated on private markets in practice? I know from experience that there can often be a bit of a gap there.

MS It’s a great question, and one that everyone in the private markets space is focused on. In my view, the key to private markets education is access—access to product specialists, research teams, and ultimately to the general partners (GPs) themselves.

Materials like product decks and whitepapers are valuable tools to build awareness and foundational knowledge, but they do not build fluency. That comes from having conversations, asking questions, and developing a deeper understanding of not only how these investments work, but how they fit within a client’s broader portfolio. Ultimately, what’s going to make an Advisor comfortable with private market solutions is not just learning the pitch, but rather getting comfortable explaining where an investment fits, addressing the risks, responding to objections, and answering the questions a client is likely to ask.

To use a college analogy, the 101-level material is relatively easy to teach. The real goal is preparing Advisors for the 201- and 301-level conversations. That’s where conviction, and importantly trust, are built, and it’s why the partnership between distribution platforms and GPs is so important.

SB Switching gears a bit, you mentioned earlier that clients’ growing interest in private markets is not so much a case of new demand as it is a function of access. When a client puts new dollars into private markets today, where is that capital typically coming from—is it genuinely new money, or is it being reallocated from other holdings?

MS Taking a step back, it’s really a question of how private market exposure is being thought about in a portfolio. The old model treated private markets as a separate, loosely-defined “alternatives” bucket sitting alongside public equity and fixed income. Increasingly, that’s not how portfolios are built. Advisors are organizing around growth and income, and private investments are sub-components of those buckets, not a standalone category next to them. That’s a significant shift from how this asset class was conceptualized in previous decades, and it’s also what determines where the capital comes from. A growth allocation gets funded from growth, an income allocation gets funded from income, because the private investment is now a component of that objective rather than a separate decision made on its own.

Suppose, for instance, that you'd like to crystalize some of the gains you've made in public equities over the past few years. You could move some of that money to private equity, creating a growth sleeve that is a mix of public and private. That trade could include a move down into growth equity or even into venture. Similarly, on the fixed income side, some Advisors are opting to reallocate from public bonds to private credit or even infrastructure or real estate. Each of these exposures would have different objectives and a different risk-return profile. Together, these hypothetical reallocations are all representative of this shift away from thinking of alternatives as a nebulous category, and toward a deeper, more thoughtful discussion of the overall objectives of a portfolio, with private market exposures sitting alongside public market exposures.

SB How much does a manager's scale—size, deal volume—matter for building a genuinely diversified portfolio, and what does that mean for smaller managers?

MS Let's focus on Evergreen products specifically here. Drawdown funds are straightforward—raise a specified amount of capital, deploy it, return it. By contrast, evergreen vehicles are continually raising, returning, and deploying capital, which means they need access to deal flow that's not just large, but broad and repeatable across sectors and geographies. Managers with scale tend to have the kind of access to drive a steady and reliable deal flow, whereas smaller managers without the same breadth may not be as well-positioned to offer these types of products.

“The number one word I would focus on here is alignment. When you're evaluating an evergreen product, you really want to understand whether the manager has any competing priorities when it comes to accessing deals.”

Scale also matters for a separate reason: how returns actually get generated today. In the early days of private equity, returns were largely generated through financial engineering—you'd buy a company with a lot of debt, use the cash flows from the business to pay down that debt, and then when you sold it, you'd own more of the company's equity than when you first bought it. It's very hard to do that now for a number of reasons. One, interest rates are meaningfully higher. And two, the space is much more competitive, so to generate returns, you fundamentally have to drive value in these companies. Scaled managers simply have more resources that they can bring to bear to help companies grow.

This isn't to say, however, that large firms always have an advantage—both large and small managers have their place. At EQT, for example, our flagship private equity funds focus on deals of anywhere between US\$1 billion and US\$5 billion in enterprise value—so, large-cap style deals, which are well positioned to serve as core parts of client portfolios. On the other hand, smaller managers can bring real focus to niche corners of the market, which is a genuine edge. Those types of deals tend to be better suited to occupying a satellite position in a client portfolio and may also make more sense as drawdown structures rather than evergreens.

SB How can an Advisor tell whether clients are getting into the same quality of deals as large institutions, versus a lesser pool?

MS The number one word I would focus on here is **alignment**. When you're evaluating an evergreen product, you really want to understand whether the manager has any competing priorities when it comes to accessing deals. A few questions can help get at that.

First, does the manager run separate evergreen products for different client segments—for example one set of funds for institutions and another for wealth investors? If so, that can create a natural question around who gets access to which opportunities.

Second, is the evergreen strategy sourcing its own deals, or is it investing alongside the manager's existing flagship drawdown funds? If the evergreen vehicle is plugging into the same funds as large institutions, then the distinction becomes less about the underlying investments and more about the structure through which investors access them. In that sense, the evergreen product is essentially providing access to the same institutional deal flow, just in a more investor-friendly format.

And third, look at skin in the game. Has the manager committed meaningful capital alongside investors in the product? That is one of the clearest ways to create alignment, because the manager is participating in the same outcomes as its clients.

SB From your seat, what's the biggest misconception Advisors have about how private markets funds—and evergreens, in particular—are actually built and managed?

MS Two come to mind. The first is liquidity. Defining evergreens as liquid or semi-liquid products is probably not the right framing, because at the end of the day, they are investing in illiquid assets. The real benefits of evergreens, in my view, are lower minimums, day-one capital deployment, vintage diversification, simplified tax reporting, and the ability to compound returns. On top of that, they do have enhanced liquidity features compared to drawdown funds, but they are still best thought of as long-term investments.

The other myth I see is the idea that evergreens are strictly retail products. Increasingly, we are seeing institutions

invest more heavily into the evergreen space as part of their portfolio construction process. And to go back to my earlier comment: we don't have an evergreen wealth product and an evergreen institutional product. For any investor on the EQT platform looking for exposure through an evergreen vehicle, there is only one solution.

SB One last question. Looking ahead over the next few years, what's the one thing that has to go right for private market exposures to become a standard part of every portfolio?

MS Of course, the education and performance need to be there. But the real barrier to entry for alternatives has been access and operational elements like subscription documents, integration and reporting. I think if we can get those right as an industry—and we're definitely on our way to doing that—then we'll see adoption continue to increase.

For more information, contact your [Regional BMO Global Asset Management Representative](#) or the [BMO GAM Alternatives Team](#) at bmogamalts@bmo.com.



Michael Stimmel
Associate Director, EQT



Sarah Banks
Senior Associate, Alternatives, BMO Global Asset Management

¹ https://www.linkedin.com/posts/eqt-group_are-you-capturing-the-full-investment-universe-ugcPost-7471245498109169664-U6tp.

² Morningstar, as of September 1, 2026.

³ "Listed domestic companies, total – United States," World Bank (World Federation of Exchanges database), as of 2025.

⁴ MSCI Europe 600 Index (USD) factsheet, as of August 31, 2026.

Disclaimers

For Advisor, Accredited Investor and Institutional Use Only.

"BMO (M-bar roundel symbol)" is a registered trademark of Bank of Montreal, used under licence.

BMO Global Asset Management (BMO GAM) is a brand name under which BMO Asset Management Inc. and BMO Investments Inc. operate. Certain of the products and services offered under the brand name, BMO Global Asset Management, are designed specifically for various categories of investors in Canada and may not be available to all investors. Products and services are only offered to investors in Canada in accordance with applicable laws and regulatory requirements.

The information contained herein: (1) is confidential and proprietary to BMO GAM; (2) may not be reproduced or distributed without the prior written consent of BMO GAM; and (3) has been obtained from third-party sources believed to be reliable but which have not been independently verified. BMO GAM and its affiliates do not accept any responsibility for any loss or damage that results from the use of this information. This article has been prepared solely for information purposes by BMO GAM.

The information provided herein does not constitute a solicitation of an offer to buy, or an offer to sell securities nor should the information be relied upon as investment advice. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

Certain statements included in this material constitute forward-looking statements, including, but not limited to, those identified by the expressions "expect", "intend", "will" and similar expressions. The forward-looking statements are not historical facts but reflect BMO GAM's current expectations regarding future results or events.

These forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results or events to differ materially from current expectations. Although BMO GAM believes that the assumptions inherent in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and, accordingly, readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on such statements due to the inherent uncertainty therein. BMO GAM undertakes no obligation to update publicly or otherwise revise any forward-looking statement or information whether as a result of new information, future events or other such factors which affect this information, except as required by law.

The viewpoints expressed by the interviewee represent their assessment and opinions at the time of publication. Those views are subject to change without notice at any time.

Third Party Links and Content

This material may contain links to other sites that BMO Global Asset Management does not own or operate. Also, links to sites that BMO Global Asset Management owns or operates may be featured on third-party websites on which we advertise, or in instances that we have not endorsed. Links to other websites or references to products, services or publications other than those of BMO Global Asset Management on this material do not imply the endorsement or approval of such websites, products, services or publication by BMO Global Asset Management. We do not manage, and we are not responsible for, the digital marketing and cookie practices of third parties. The linked websites have separate and independent privacy statements, notices and terms of use, which we recommend you read carefully.



Hedge funds: The new fixed income alternative?

Michael Hillman of Goldman Sachs sits down with Thomas Banks of Silver Point Capital to discuss the strategies, philosophy, and experience that have made Silver Point a leader in the hedge fund space—and what it takes for a credit investor to thrive in periods of heightened volatility.

Authors: Thomas Banks | Managing Director, Silver Point Capital
Michael Hillman | Vice President, External Investing Group (XIG), Hedge Funds, Goldman Sachs Asset Management

As market volatility persists and the correlation between public stock and bond performance remains unusually positive, investors are exploring alternative strategies to manage their downside risk. One such solution? Hedge funds. In this exclusive conversation, Michael Hillman, Vice President, External Investing Group (XIG), Hedge Funds, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, speaks with Thomas Banks, Managing Director, Silver Point Capital, breaking down the principles that have enabled Silver Point to capitalize on uncertainty across multiple market cycles

Michael Hillman (MH) For those that may not be familiar with Silver Point Capital, can you briefly describe the firm?

Thomas Banks (TB) Silver Point is a global credit investor, with a particular focus on corporate credit. Today, we have five lines of business: We're very active in opportunistic credit in both public and private markets, and have both our hedge fund business as well as dislocation funds. We also have a tactical credit opportunities business. We have a large and successful direct lending business. And we have a rapidly-growing Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) business, which accesses public markets.

MH Going back to the inception of the firm, can you give a sense of how Silver Point has evolved?

TB One of the hallmarks of Silver Point is that we've always maintained a focus on the things we do well. We very much believe in edges, which is to say that we want to develop, exploit, and consistently refine the advantages that we have

"One of the hallmarks of Silver Point is that we've always maintained a focus on the things we do well. We very much believe in edges, which is to say that we want to develop, exploit, and consistently refine the advantages that we have in the marketplace."

in the marketplace. The firm has been very thoughtfully grown by our founders, Ed Mulé and Bob O'Shea, to build on our core competencies by expanding across new business lines that we believe are synergistic to the whole. For example, we started in 2002 as a hedge fund investing in opportunistic credit. Our first product addition was our dedicated direct lending funds, followed by drawdown opportunistic funds, which offered investors the ability to increase their exposure to dislocated credit at the most opportune times, and to do so on a long-only basis, timing being a key element of risk management in that kind of fund structure.

Our most recent evolution has been to enter the CLO market, which we did for a couple of reasons. For one, we believe that CLO equity, as part of our broader credit platform, is a very attractive investment strategy. But the CLO business is also incredibly synergistic to what we do in opportunistic credit. Our CLO business is focused on new issues, so as banks bring them to market, our team is attending investor presentations, analysing data, and following them on a quarterly basis through earnings calls and other updates. It is those companies that essentially form the pipeline for our opportunistic credit business. When they miss earnings or reduce guidance and their price declines, one of our CLO analysts often knows the company very well, which enables us to act quickly—and in our world, speed can be a major competitive advantage.

I would also add that our philosophy is to always approach markets with a focus on specialization and with an abundance of resources, because that's how we believe we can maximize the opportunity set. Some of our competitors would have their existing analyst team cover both opportunistic credit and CLOs, and in some respects, that would have been the easiest way for us to enter the CLO market. That is not how we do things, however. We believe that being a CLO analyst required a different skillset than being a special situations analyst. So, in our case, rather than increasing the aperture of what our analysts were covering, we went out and hired a completely standalone team of CLO analysts, leveraging the knowledge base of our existing sector analysts to identify what we believe to be the best CLO team in the field.

“The core of our opportunistic business is buying—at a discount to par—loans and bonds that we believe are misunderstood or mispriced and should appreciate significantly.”

MH I’m curious about the handoff from the CLO team to the opportunistic credit team when an opportunity is identified. How does that work?

TB That’s the beauty of an organization like Silver Point. Our public opportunistic and public CLO teams sit together on one trading floor, attend the same weekly meetings, and both report to J.T. Davis, our Head of Public Investing. There’s a high degree of communication, collaboration and teamwork between these teams (subject to compliance oversight), which is part of our ethos. The handoff of information is a seamless process since there is such frequent communication between the relevant sector analysts.

MH Can you touch on Silver Point’s ownership approach and active engagement as an investor? How does that create value?

TB The core of our opportunistic business is buying—at a discount to par—loans and bonds that we

believe are misunderstood or mispriced and should appreciate significantly. One key element of our process is identifying the catalyst that will cause those instruments to move from where they’re currently being traded to where we believe their value truly lies. Once we have identified that catalyst, we want to deploy resources to accelerate value realization. If, for instance, we buy something at \$70 that we think is worth more, the faster that instrument goes from \$70 to par, the better our returns, the lower our risk, and the quicker we can reinvest in the next instrument. Our approach is to engage with management and with other creditors and stakeholders to develop strategies to drive names from their current level to our view of their fair value.

We believe our size is also an advantage; we’ve observed that it’s becoming much more difficult for smaller players to catch a “free ride” on the restructuring work of larger firms. Liability management exercises are a good example of this dynamic, as a smaller player might buy something on the belief that they’re buying into a first lien only to find out that 51% of the creditors have engaged with the equity, shifted the collateral and voted through an amendment such that they’re not a first lien anymore on the most valuable assets of the company. As an investor in credit, what you want to know is: how can I reliably be with the firms that will form the 51%? And the two most common attributes of firms that are in the 51% are that they’re the largest players, and they’re the most sophisticated players. That’s what we bring at Silver Point.

MH It seems like one of the edges Silver Point brings to the table is a very healthy understanding of the policy environment. Can you elaborate on how you follow policy developments, and how they impact investment decisions?

TB I would agree with you on that. Part of our founders’ philosophy is that we are always going to seek to be a very resource-rich firm, and one of those resources is an understanding of policy—where things are moving in the capitals of the world, especially in this environment of interventionist governments. We think that’s a critical component of our investment process. We’ve invested significant time and resources to develop relationships in Washington, for instance, on both sides of the aisle, who can help us to understand the administration’s priorities, what Congress is thinking, what the federal bureaucracy’s perspective is, and so on. We then use that intelligence to refine our probabilistic models such that they incorporate the impact of potential policy changes.

In addition to policy (and equally as important), Silver Point also very much benefits from our understanding of the nuances of legal processes. In particular, our knowledge of restructuring processes has been a consistent edge for us, as we’ve been able to use those processes both to improve the companies we’re invested in and to structure better outcomes for our investors. That includes taking advantage of the tools available in bankruptcy so that these companies have the best chance of a fresh start on the other side. We’re big believers in leveraging that process alpha, which comes with a strong knowledge of bankruptcy and creditor law. On a personal level, I received a law degree from the University of

Chicago before starting my career in investment banking. In my five years at another firm, I can't think of a single time I used my law degree. But since I joined Silver Point 20 years ago, there hasn't been a single day when I *haven't* used it.

MH Speaking of your 20-year history at Silver Point—what was your experience during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-09? Did it leave a lasting legacy on the firm?

TB Absolutely. One of our principles our founders care deeply about is continuous improvement, and the GFC taught us all a lot of significant lessons that we continue to employ today. One of the most persistent lessons has been the importance of being students of the macro environment in a way that we believe is unique among credit investors. Credit investors often have a reputation as “stock jockeys”—they tend to have the perception that as long as they buy something at the top of the capital structure, they'll be fine. They may know their company really well, but they may not be paying attention to the macro climate. That didn't work in the GFC, because it was an instance where the macro overwhelmed the micro. That's why, coming out of the crisis, we hired what we call a Markets Analyst, and we instituted our Markets Committee, which meets every week to debate, discuss, and reflect on where we are in the current economic cycle. That committee ultimately informs how much we hedge, what we hedge with, and how aggressive we want to be in deployment. We believe the

“Silver Point's opportunistic hedge fund is a product that is designed for uncertain times, and if we do see a major dislocation, we believe that will create significant opportunities for which we are well-positioned to take advantage.”

implementation of this committee has been very additive to our investment process and risk management.

MH Are there particular ways you've brought lessons from the GFC forward to the recent credit cycle?

TB Currently, we're in a period of more extensive government intervention, with governments essentially trying to prevent what would otherwise be the natural distress cycle. The COVID period broke a new barrier, as the U.S. government started to step in directly and buy the obligations of corporate issuers—but only for the large corporate sector. As a manager, we need to be agile and pivot based on where we're seeing this intervention. In the early stages of COVID, we were buying instruments in investment grade credit and large corporate issuers partially on the expectation that the government would step in and support that market, and that proved to be correct. After markets had repriced to reflect the level of government intervention, we pivoted to the middle market. We believe that's one of the benefits of our platform—we can very effectively invest across the broad spectrum of opportunistic credit, from the largest and most sophisticated issuers to a US\$300 million loan-only middle market business.

We have often heard from investors, even from our competitors, for instance, that there really wasn't much to do in COVID. That was not our experience whatsoever; we were incredibly busy. The approximately US\$30 billion we deployed during that period reflects the fact that we have expertise, relationships, and presence in middle markets that we believe very few firms of our size and sophistication have.

MH Distressed deal flow has grown quite a bit in recent months, which makes some investors nervous. However, what many don't understand is that the private credit market has grown enormously recently, so the fact that we've seen more deals doesn't necessarily mean that a greater percentage of companies are in trouble—just that the market itself is bigger. Can you comment on that?

TB That's spot on. You have to disaggregate percentages from dollars. Right now, as opportunistic credit investors, we care about the dollar size of the opportunity. But if we were a performing investor, we would care about percentages. Leverage



BMO GAM's Adam Abitbol wingsuit skydiving at Whitehaven Beach, Queensland, Australia.

finance markets—including private credit—are currently about three times as large as they were in 2008. But that masks the fact that they're also much weaker in terms of these businesses being more levered. The Single B credit market, which is at the lower end of the corporate rating spectrum, is five times larger than in 2008. So not only has the overall market size tripled, but the mix within the market has changed. What happened was that COVID brought about a “free lunch” period as interest rates approached zero (for an extended period of time). That created an incentive for issuers to become loan-only issuers to access low variable interest rates rather than having a more typical mix of loans and fixed rate bonds in their capital structures. These loan-only capital structures proved to be incredibly fragile as rates started to rise. What we've now seen over the last couple of years is companies with these aggressive capital structures, built entirely on floating rates, struggling under the weight of their debt service, which has led to an increase in defaults. To go back to your original point: as a percentage of the market, we're still at relatively normal levels. But in dollar terms, because markets have grown, these are very large, distressed credit markets. And for a manager like us, we believe that is great for opportunity set.

MH Is this distress across the spectrum, or are you seeing it in particular sectors or geographies?

TB What we have increasingly seen are “rolling recessions,” where particular sectors undergo a significant level of stress while the broader index remains very tight. For example, beginning in 2022, we've seen stress in the Telecom sector, which was characterized by restructuring or liability management at firms like Lumen, EchoStar, and Altice. More recently, we've also been seeing it in chemicals, which have had to deal with an abundance of competition from China, as well as in paper and packaging and building

“One of the hallmarks of our culture is that we don’t expect younger employees to always agree with senior analysts. We want healthy debate, because not all of these decisions are obvious calls, and smart people can have different views.”

products. More recently, we’ve seen the software market crack significantly as investors try to assess what the disruptions of artificial intelligence (AI) will be. Our view is that any time there is a move of that magnitude, attractive opportunities will be created, and we’ll be pursuing those.

MH When you look at opportunistic investing, investors are ultimately subject to the credit cycle, which may or may not present certain opportunities. Can you discuss how Silver Point seeks to generate returns even when we’re not in a distressed cycle?

TB I’ve mentioned how much credit markets, and especially weaker credit markets, have expanded. We are in what we consider to be a robust

opportunistic credit environment despite the fact that spreads are approaching all-time tights for index level spreads. Our ability to generate returns is a result not only of the expansion of the market, but also our strong presence in opportunistic credit. We’ve set our business model up in terms of resources and organized those resources such that we believe we can source, invest in and drive many opportunities at once. We also believe our depth of resources also allows us to uncover opportunities (turn over more stones, if you will) in what people might characterize as a more benign credit cycle. And the synergies we’ve created across the platform, such as the CLO team I mentioned earlier, are also additive to being able to uncover what we believe to be attractive opportunities. Finally, and importantly, many of our competitors have chosen to focus their efforts on direct lending, primarily to sponsor backed businesses and to avoid being known for being in tough restructuring situations with sponsors. As a result, they have de-emphasized their secondary opportunistic credit businesses. That has been the right choice for them, but it has also been great for us, as it’s left a vacuum in the market that we’ve been able to fill.

MH In the highly competitive world of private credit, how does Silver Point find the leaders of tomorrow?

TB That’s a great question. We believe having the best talent has always been one of our edges, and being an employer of choice for people who want to invest in credit is incredibly important to us. What we have found is that our size and presence in the marketplace has created a virtuous cycle with respect to the acquisition of talent—if you’re someone who is inclined towards a career in opportunistic credit investing, we are a large and active platform in the space. As we attract ambitious and talented people, we are able to improve and outperform, which then helps us to attract the next person. The reason why investors have shied away from smaller credit managers in today’s market—due to their difficulty generating alpha—we believe is the same reason why talented employees at smaller managers put their hands up and want to come to Silver Point.

Retaining talent is also a big priority for us, and our culture plays a significant role in that. As I’ve mentioned, we operate in an incredibly collaborative fashion—younger employees have a voice in every one of our credit committee decisions and provide their opinions on how they would approach particular investments. That acts as both a beneficial process for us, because they often have keen insights that we may otherwise miss, and as a good learning opportunity for them. One of the hallmarks of our culture is that we don’t expect younger employees to always agree with senior analysts. We want healthy debate, because not all of these decisions are obvious calls, and smart people can have different views. By discussing and debating them, we can weight the merits of the arguments and find the optimal path.

MH If you were advising a private wealth client, what's the single most important point you'd emphasize about navigating credit markets?

TB Credit investing is naturally about risk management—understanding and protecting your downside. What we're always trying to find are asymmetric investment opportunities with limited downside risk, and where the downside is limited for multiple reasons. At Silver Point, often we're buying into the top of the capital structure. We're buying into secured investments, which give us a process advantage if a company goes into a restructuring. And we're buying at a discount, which means we're putting less capital at risk. On top of that, we are also using position and portfolio hedges to seek to mitigate any sort of mark-to-market volatility we may experience. That's how we approach credit investing: first and foremost, you have to protect your downside, and then your focus can be on asymmetric opportunities that can drive real upside.

MH How can investors know which manager offers the best investment approach and downside protection?

TB You have to study periods of intense market volatility. You can't just look at the last 12 months—rather, you need to look at a year like 2022, for example, when high yield markets were down 11%. How did a manager

perform *that* year? And when you assess that performance, it is also important to assess how exposed they are to the market, and what their process is for managing risk.

We've gone through multiple periods of intense volatility. And, importantly, Ed Mulé, who is our Portfolio Manager and CEO, has been doing this since the mid-1990s. He's seen the 1993-94 Latin American Tequila Crisis, 1997 Asian financial crisis, the dot-com bubble, the GFC, and so on. We believe that's an incredibly powerful weapon to have at the top of the house.

MH Finally, what are you most excited about over the next couple of years?

TB It feels like we are entering a period of very heightened volatility and increased dispersion, in which significant winners and losers will be created. Those are the types of environments where we believe we can thrive. Silver Point's opportunistic hedge fund is a product that is designed for uncertain times, and if we do see a major dislocation, we believe that will create significant opportunities for which we are well-positioned to take advantage.

Canadian investors can access Silver Point via the [Alpha Managers Hedge Fund](#). For more information, contact your [Regional BMO Global Asset Management Representative](#) or the [BMO GAM Alternatives Team](#) at bmogamalts@bmo.com.



Thomas Banks
Managing Director, Silver Point Capital



Michael Hillman
Vice President, External Investing Group (XIG), Hedge Funds,
Goldman Sachs Asset Management

Disclaimers

For Advisor, Institutional and Accredited Investor Use Only.

"BMO (M-bar roundel symbol)" is a registered trademark of Bank of Montreal, used under licence.

BMO Global Asset Management (BMO GAM) is a brand name under which BMO Asset Management Inc. and BMO Investments Inc. operate. Certain of the products and services offered under the brand name, BMO Global Asset Management, are designed specifically for various categories of investors in Canada and may not be available to all investors. Products and services are only offered to investors in Canada in accordance with applicable laws and regulatory requirements.

The information contained herein: (1) is confidential and proprietary to BMO GAM; (2) may not be reproduced or distributed without the prior written consent of BMO GAM; and (3) has been obtained from third-party sources believed to be reliable but which have not been independently verified. BMO GAM and its affiliates do not accept any responsibility for any loss or damage that results from the use of this information. This article has been prepared solely for information purposes by BMO GAM.

The information provided herein does not constitute a solicitation of an offer to buy, or an offer to sell securities nor should the information be relied upon as investment advice. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

The viewpoints expressed by the interviewees represent their assessment and opinions at the time of publication. Those views are subject to change without notice at any time. They do not represent the views or expectations of BMO GAM or Alpha Managers Hedge Fund LP. The information provided herein does not constitute a solicitation of an offer to buy, or an offer to sell securities nor should the information be relied upon as investment advice. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. This article is intended for informational purposes only.

This communication is provided to you on the understanding that you will understand and accept its inherent limitations, you will not rely on it in making or recommending any investment decision with respect to any securities that may be issued, and you will use it only for the purpose of considering your preliminary interest in investing in a transaction of the type described herein.

A subscription for units of the Alpha Managers Hedge Fund (the "Fund") should be considered only by persons financially able to maintain their investment and who can bear the risk of loss associated with an investment in the Fund. Prospective investors should consult with their own independent professional legal, tax, investment and financial advisors before purchasing units of the Fund in order to determine the appropriateness of this investment in relation to their financial and investment objectives and in relation to the tax consequences of any such investment.

Prospective investors should consider the risks described in the confidential offering memorandum (OM) of the Fund before purchasing units of the Fund. Any or all of these risks, or other as yet unidentified risks, may have a material adverse effect on the Fund's business and/or the return to investors. See the offering documents of the Fund.

In addition to the risks described in the OM of the Fund, the Fund will bear risks associated with investment into strategies run by a Cayman Limited Liability Company, managed by an affiliate of The Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (the "Managers Fund") in proportion to the amount of the Fund's investment in the Managers Fund, as the Fund will invest substantially all of its assets in the Managers Fund through intermediary vehicles. Prospective investors in the Fund should therefore carefully consider the risks described under the offering memorandum of the Managers Fund. Certain institutional investors could access the Managers Fund through an intermediary fund structured as an Ontario limited partnership, the features of such investors' investment may vary from those described herein.

Silver Point Disclaimers

This material does not constitute an offer to sell, or the solicitation of an offer to buy, interests in the investment funds or products of Silver Point Capital, L.P. (each, a "Fund" and collectively, the "Funds"). Such an offer or solicitation may only be made by delivery of each Fund's Confidential Offering Memorandum (each, a "Memorandum") and subscription documents that contain a more detailed description of all the material terms of such an investment, including discussions of certain specific risk factors, conflicts (or potential conflicts) of interest, tax considerations, fees and other matters relevant to prospective investors in such Fund. This presentation is expressly qualified in its entirety by reference to each Fund's Memorandum and subscription documents. The information provided herein is not intended to be, and should not be, considered a substitute for reviewing such documents carefully. Furthermore, the information herein is not intended to provide, and should not be relied upon for, accounting, legal or tax advice or investment recommendations. To the extent of any inconsistency or discrepancy between the Memorandum and this presentation, the Memorandum shall control. Capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in each Fund's Memorandum.

Except as otherwise specified herein, the information contained herein is believed to be accurate as of the date set forth on the cover. No assurance is made as to its continued accuracy after such date. No representation or warranty is made, whether express or implied, by the Fund or by the Firm or any of their partners, employees, members, or agents as to the completeness of the information provided herein. This material does not confer any rights on the recipients thereof or impose any obligations on Silver Point. In furnishing this material, Silver Point does not undertake to update any of the information contained herein or to correct any inaccuracies or notify investors of a variance or breach of any of the policies described. All information contained herein is subject to revision without notice.

An investment in a Fund may not be suitable for all investors. These investments are illiquid, present significant risks, and may be sold or withdrawn/redeemed at more or less than the original amount invested.

Investing in financial markets involves a substantial degree of risk. There can be no assurance that the investment objectives of the Fund will be achieved. Investment losses may occur, and investors could lose some or all of their investment. No guarantee or representation is made that the Fund's investment program, including, without limitation, its investment strategies, diversification, or risk monitoring goals will be successful, and investment results may vary substantially over time. Nothing herein is intended to imply that the Fund's investment methodology may be considered "conservative," "safe," "risk-free," or "risk-averse."

Certain information contained herein constitutes "forward-looking statements," which can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as "may," "will," "should," "expect," "anticipate," "project," "estimate," "intend," "continue," or "believe," or the negatives thereof or other variations thereon or comparable terminology. Due to various risks and uncertainties, actual events or results or the actual performance of the Fund may differ materially from those reflected or contemplated in such forward-looking statements.

The role of private markets in modern portfolio construction

Private markets are becoming an increasingly important part of the portfolio conversation. But as access expands, so too does the need to understand the opportunities, trade-offs and risks involved. From portfolio fit to evergreen structures and liquidity trade-offs, Partners Group's Adam Howarth unpacks what Advisors and accredited investors need to know.

Author: Adam Howarth | Co-Head of Global Portfolio Management, Partners Group

As portfolio construction evolves, why should Advisors and accredited investors consider adding alternatives, particularly private markets, to a traditional stock-and-bond portfolio?

Adam Howarth (AH) The reason is simple: private markets can provide meaningful diversification. They have been used successfully for decades to broaden the investment opportunity set and diversify portfolios beyond traditional public markets. Today, public stock markets are highly concentrated and increasingly dominated by a relatively small number of very large companies in select sectors.

Private markets, by contrast, give investors access to a broader range of businesses and industries across the economy, particularly companies that will remain privately owned. It's why I believe the 'public versus private' debate is too narrow. We need to move beyond choosing one over the other and instead focus on expanding the opportunity set and diversifying beyond the companies that dominate public markets, particularly in the business-to-business (B2B) private companies space, which is generally less accessible to individual investors. These companies can be an attractive source of long-term value as well as meaningful diversification for clients' portfolios.

"...evergreen structures have made private markets much easier to navigate and use, bringing the experience closer to what investors are accustomed to in public markets."

How much should investors and Advisors realistically allocate to private markets—is 10–15% a reasonable starting point?

AH It really depends. We've worked with individual investors and their Advisors in private markets for over 20 years, and comfort levels vary widely. Some investors are very at ease with the duration and illiquidity involved—often because they built their own wealth by owning and operating a single business, which naturally builds comfort with long-term commitments. Others are less comfortable stepping into something new within a portfolio.

At the same time, there are more products, structures, and vehicles today designed to make private-market investing easier and more flexible—alternatives to the traditional approach of committing capital to a single private fund. Taken together, there isn't one right allocation for everyone. The appropriate starting point depends on the investor's risk tolerance, comfort with illiquidity and long-term commitments, and the investment vehicle being used. Today's range of structures also gives Advisors more flexibility to introduce private markets gradually, rather than all at once.

Evergreen structures are often positioned as a simpler entry point into private markets. What makes them easier to access, and what should investors and Advisors still be mindful of?

AH One of the challenges slowing the adoption of private markets in individual portfolios is subscribing to closed-end funds. It's a complex process, whether you're projecting how your net asset value (NAV) will develop over time, timing the market, or determining unfunded capital exposure. Evergreen structures, however, can simplify the process of establishing and maintaining a private-market allocation by allowing investors to get invested more quickly and providing greater visibility into their actual exposure.

That said, they are still private-market investments, and Advisors and investors should approach them with a medium- to long-term mindset rather than view them as vehicles for short-term market timing. Yes, they may offer redemption features that allow investors to access their capital earlier, but I generally recommend a medium- to long-term time horizon to give the investment time to perform. Overall, evergreen structures have made private markets much easier to navigate and use, bringing the experience closer to what investors are accustomed to in public markets.

“Liquidity is one of my biggest concerns. Managers need to hold enough liquid assets to meet investor redemption requests while keeping enough of the portfolio invested in private-market opportunities to generate the returns investors expect.”

Liquidity¹ is a hot topic when it comes to evergreens and private markets in general, particularly from the client’s perspective. How can Advisors clearly explain the liquidity trade-offs and reassure clients about what they’re taking on?

AH Liquidity is one of my biggest concerns. Managers need to hold enough liquid assets to meet investor redemption requests while keeping enough of the portfolio invested in

private-market opportunities to generate the returns investors expect. At the end of the day, it’s a balancing act: holding too much cash may make it easier to meet redemptions, but it can also dilute performance.

When it comes to explaining liquidity to clients, it’s important to communicate that evergreen vehicles combine redemption features with underlying assets that are typically held for the long term. That creates a potential mismatch, which the manager needs to actively manage. They can do this by drawing on several sources of liquidity within the structure: new investor inflows, a dedicated liquidity sleeve, and cash generated as investments are sold or distributed. For investors, however, the most important consideration is the time horizon. These are long-term strategies, and the structure works better when investors understand that they’re making a long-term allocation rather than planning to move in and out of the fund over a couple of years.

Manager discipline is equally important, particularly during periods of market stress. When markets are strong, liquidity is relatively easy to manage. But when markets decline and redemption requests increase, managers need to have sufficient liquidity to meet those demands while also protecting the portfolio. That’s why we monitor liquidity closely and adjust our position based on market conditions. When managed effectively, it can serve both as a defensive tool and as an opportunity to invest when valuations become more attractive.

For more information, contact your [Regional BMO Global Asset Management Representative](#) or the [BMO GAM Alternatives Team](#) at bmogamalts@bmo.com.



Adam Howarth

Co-Head of Global Portfolio Management, Partners Group

¹ Liquidity: The degree to which an asset or security can be quickly bought or sold in the market without affecting the asset's price. Cash is considered to be the most liquid asset, while things like fine art or rare books would be relatively illiquid.

Disclaimers

For Advisor, Institutional and Accredited Investor Use Only.

BMO (M-bar roundel symbol)™ is a registered trademark of Bank of Montreal, used under licence.

BMO Global Asset Management (BMO GAM) is a brand name under which BMO Asset Management Inc. and BMO Investments Inc. operate. Certain of the products and services offered under the brand name, BMO Global Asset Management, are designed specifically for various categories of investors in Canada and may not be available to all investors. Products and services are only offered to investors in Canada in accordance with applicable laws and regulatory requirements.

The information contained herein: (1) is confidential and proprietary to BMO GAM; (2) may not be reproduced or distributed without the prior written consent of BMO GAM; and (3) has been obtained from third-party sources believed to be reliable but which have not been independently verified. BMO GAM and its affiliates do not accept any responsibility for any loss or damage that results from the use of this information. This article has been prepared solely for information purposes by BMO GAM.

The information provided herein does not constitute a solicitation of an offer to buy, or an offer to sell securities nor should the information be relied upon as investment advice. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

Certain statements included in this material constitute forward-looking statements, including, but not limited to, those identified by the expressions "expect", "intend", "will" and similar expressions. The forward-looking statements are not historical facts but reflect BMO GAM's current expectations regarding future results or events. These forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results or events to differ materially from current expectations. Although BMO GAM believes that the assumptions inherent in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and, accordingly, readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on such statements due to the inherent uncertainty therein. BMO GAM undertakes no obligation to update publicly or otherwise revise any forward-looking statement or information whether as a result of new information, future events or other such factors which affect this information, except as required by law.

The viewpoints expressed by the interviewees represent their assessment and opinions at the time of publication. Those views are subject to change without notice at any time. The information provided herein does not constitute a solicitation of an offer to buy, or an offer to sell securities nor should the information be relied upon as investment advice. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. This article is intended for informational purposes only.



Manager Profile: Peter Mackie
Global Head, Credit Distribution, The Carlyle Group

Winning in private credit takes a team

Authors: Peter Mackie | Global Head, Credit Distribution, The Carlyle Group
Guillaume Lagourgue | Managing Director, Head of Alternatives Distribution, BMO Global Asset Management

Peter Mackie, Global Head of Credit Distribution at Carlyle, explains why ‘lone wolves’ don’t survive in the high yield market.

Guillaume Lagourgue (GL) As someone who helped build an incredible private credit business within Carlyle, can you tell us what goes into the secret sauce?

Peter Mackie (PM) In a word—teamwork. I have worked for the largest firms in this business for 30 years, and I can tell you from personal experience that collaboration is essential. We don't want lone wolves at Carlyle; we want a culture where everyone doing their job well means that one-plus-one can equal three. Luckily, our leadership is extremely forward-thinking in this respect. I knew Harvey Schwartz from my days at Goldman Sachs, and I knew

CARLYLE SNAPSHOT

Headquarters	Washington DC, USA
Exchange	Nasdaq
Assets under management	US\$485 billion as of June 30, 2026
Staff	2,500 professionals
Global footprint	28 offices across four continents
Year established	1987

that when he started four years ago, he would prioritize collaboration across all our business lines.

The other special ingredient is our scale. Performing due diligence on private credit opportunities requires a tremendous amount of resources. Carlyle not only has the size and capacity to undertake these responsibilities, but we also benefit from cooperation across our Private Equity and Carlyle AlInvest lines of business.

GL On the subject of previous experience, what was your journey prior to the becoming Carlyle’s Head of Private Credit Distribution?

PM I grew up in Boston and went to university in the area before eventually moving to New York. There, I started my career on the High Yield/Distressed desk at Goldman Sachs. Over the next 13 years, I moved back and forth between Boston and New York while building a specialization in the high yield segment of the market. My role was to cover credit investors, such as hedge funds,

insurers and asset managers. A group of us eventually moved to Barclays in 2006 but that part of the journey was disrupted two years later by the Great Financial Crisis. Barclays was absorbed into Lehman Brothers and, coincidentally, right around that time I married a Canadian who was eager to move home. We lived in Toronto for about 10 years as our kids grew up, which gave me an opportunity to help develop the leveraged credit business at a Canadian bank.

At the time, Canadian banks were viewed globally as a safe harbour compared to their over-levered peers to the south. While this was undeniably a virtue, it also meant that there was a lack of understanding on how to successfully invest in distressed credit markets. I brought that experience to bear and soon managed all of the relationships with the 'Maple 8' institutional funds and other large asset managers. Once we had built a large enough footprint in North American credit, I ended up overseeing all of fixed income, including both the rates and derivatives desks.

Parenthetically, my wife and I are now back within commuting distance of Carlyle's global headquarters in New York, but we still have solid roots in Canada.

GL Saying you “went to university” in the Boston area doesn’t quite tell the full story. Isn’t it true that you studied—and played football—at Harvard University?

PM Yes—I completed both my undergraduate and MBA degrees at Harvard and played defensive tackle

“ If we see greater certainty from both inflation measures and central banks, we could see a corresponding increase in corporate mergers and acquisitions that in turn accelerates the velocity of our deal flow.”

for the Crimson, which helped form my insistence on teamwork throughout my career. Discipline, focus, endurance; there are so many lessons to take from athletics. You learn how to win, and how to lose. More importantly, your success on the field is only made possible by the quality of the work you put in during the off hours, and how consistently you apply effort over time. There are no shortcuts. Similarly, at Carlyle, we do not endorse “hero culture” but rather roll up our sleeves and do the work as a unit. Also, if we want to stretch the metaphor, we can say that at Carlyle, in credit, we play defense first by prioritizing the preservation of capital, and then go on offense to take advantage of opportunities.

GL Interesting. Can you describe how your team operates?

PM Historically, Carlyle has been known as a major competitor in private equity¹ and the same has been true for Carlyle Alpinvest in the secondaries market.² As the industry pivoted to credit, however, we built a credit specialist team to compete. The North American side is divided by channel and then by geography, such that we have a dedicated support person for each region. Within the institutional channel alone—which includes pensions, foundations, endowments and sovereign wealth funds—there are three managing directors who report to me; our insurance channel is run by a partner and a managing director; and, we have a slate of regional specialists who are each assigned a specific geography to manage.

Internationally, the setup looks quite different. It’s important to remember that market structures vary and our role is to adapt the service model to suit them. Japan and Hong Kong each have two dedicated professionals and Europe has six. The dedicated coverage we provide in North America is required because of the depth of the investor base and how the clients themselves prefer to be engaged. Some periphery markets, for example, like to work with generalists who can speak to a broader solution set whereas in Canada, investors tend to prefer credit experts who focus on that particular sub-asset class. We recognize these nuances and have built a structure that works well across multiple geographies.

“We are also excited about the growth of asset-based finance. Many people point to the regulatory and capital developments there, but I think the evolution of accounting regimes has been an equally important driver.”

GL Given the current macro outlook—from interest rates to geopolitics—what are you most excited about within the private credit space?

PM As mentioned, we have ambitious growth targets for our existing private credit lineup which seeks to provide solutions for borrowers and investors. And in this volatile interest rate environment, it should be noted that a substantial portion of our holdings rely on floating rates, not fixed. However, consistency of rates is always helpful. If we see greater certainty from both inflation measures and central banks, we could see a corresponding increase in corporate mergers and acquisitions that in turn accelerates the velocity of our deal flow. The concept of “higher for longer” is now the reality for many buyout shops; plus, lower rates sometimes hurt the returns in fixed income assets,

so we anticipate that current inflation trends could support the massive capital formation that has taken place recently in private credit.

We are also excited about the growth of asset-based finance. Many people point to the regulatory and bank capital requirements, but I also think the evolution of accounting treatment and global bank models have been equally important drivers. Rules such as the Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) effectively force banks to pull forward their estimated losses to create “Day 1” reserves rather than spread them out. What this does is reduce the banks’ Return on Equity (ROE), a measure that has become increasingly important to shareholders, so that rather than holding these assets on their balance sheets, many banks may end up partnering with external credit managers who can step in to create more custom solutions.

GL What would you say to Advisors and investors whose confidence has been shaken by negative headlines?

PM There have been a number of high-profile incidents around private credit in North America recently. However, many of those issues revolved around fraud or malpractice rather than systemic risk. In addition, several of the high-profile cases involved banks and not private credit. We feel this underscores the necessity of prudent manager selection—private markets have much larger dispersion than public markets and the nature of unique portfolio company holdings means performance can be highly differentiated even among similar mandates. The truth is experience matters. We have seen plenty of “tourists” enter the business in recent years as private credit has become a more attractive asset class. But do they have sufficient risk controls? Do they have the resources, data and bench strength to conduct the appropriate due diligence? The list of firms that satisfy these criteria is surprisingly short.

At Carlyle, we surpassed our funding targets for both 2024 and 2025 because our team has the scale and capability to ensure deep coverage in the areas where we invest. We have enormous flexibility to underwrite loans based on our multi-line credit platform, and firm wide resources to help manage situations well before they become more serious problems. Also, our collateralized loan obligation (CLO) business is among the largest in the world,³ and provides valuable market intel that we use to make smarter decisions. There’s also a roster of ex-CEOs that we can tap should we need operational insight from tried-and-true operators. All this to say: while we acknowledge that there was a tremendous amount of noise this past summer, we also know that negative headlines exist to garner attention, not wisdom. Ultimately, I believe that the formula for success remains the same: assemble a talented group of experienced professionals and give them the time and resources to do the work.

For more information, contact your [Regional BMO Global Asset Management Representative](#) or the [BMO GAM Alternatives Team](#) at bmogamalts@bmo.com.

¹ [Top 100 Private Equity Firms: 2026 Rankings by AUM, Praxis Rock Advisors, August 5, 2026.](#)

² [Top 10 Secondaries Fund Managers, Dakota Marketplace, March 5, 2026.](#)

³ [US CLO Manager Rankings: Collateral AUM, CLO Research Group, September 4, 2026.](#)

Disclaimers

For Advisors and Institutional Client Use Only.

"BMO (M-bar roundel symbol)" is a registered trademark of Bank of Montreal, used under licence.

BMO Global Asset Management (BMO GAM) is a brand name under which BMO Asset Management Inc. and BMO Investments Inc. operate. Certain of the products and services offered under the brand name, BMO Global Asset Management, are designed specifically for various categories of investors in Canada and may not be available to all investors. Products and services are only offered to investors in Canada in accordance with applicable laws and regulatory requirements.

The information contained herein: (1) is confidential and proprietary; (2) may not be reproduced or distributed without the prior written consent of BMO GAM; and (3) has been obtained from third party sources believed to be reliable but which have not been independently verified. BMO GAM and its affiliates do not accept any responsibility for any loss or damage that results from the use of this information. This article has been prepared solely for information purposes by BMO GAM.

The information provided herein does not constitute a solicitation of an offer to buy, or an offer to sell securities nor should the information be relied upon as investment advice. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

Certain statements included in this material constitute forward-looking statements, including, but not limited to, those identified by the expressions "expect", "intend", "will" and similar expressions. The forward-looking statements are not historical facts but reflect BMO GAM's current expectations regarding future results or events. These forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results or events to differ materially from current expectations. Although BMO GAM believes that the assumptions inherent in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and, accordingly, readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on such statements due to the inherent uncertainty therein. BMO GAM undertakes no obligation to update publicly or otherwise revise any forward-looking statement or information whether as a result of new information, future events or other such factors which affect this information, except as required by law.

On Your Radar

Resources for the alternative investor

BMO PARTNERS GROUP PRIVATE MARKETS FUND

MARKETING

[Web Page Overview](#)
[Presentation \(Investor\)](#)
[Client Aid A \(Series F\)](#)
[Client Aid A \(Series F | Chinese\)](#)
[Client Aid B \(Series F\)](#)

LEGAL

[Application for Subsequent Subscriptions](#)
[Subscription Agreement \(Series F\)](#)
[Subscription Agreement Tool \(Smart Form\)](#)

PRODUCT

[Monthly Commentary \(June 2026\)](#)
[Monthly Commentary \(May 2026\)](#)
[Investment Case Studies \(Client\)](#)
[Common Due Diligence Questions \(Client\)](#)
[Top Holding Case Studies](#)

BMO CARLYLE PRIVATE EQUITY STRATEGY PARTNERSHIP

MARKETING

[Web Page Overview](#)
[Press Release](#)
[Presentation \(Investor\)](#)
[Client Aid A \(Series F\)](#)
[Client Aid B \(Series F\)](#)
[Client Aid B \(Series F | Chinese\)](#)

LEGAL

[Application for Subsequent Subscriptions](#)
[Subscription Agreement \(Series F\)](#)
[Subscription Agreement Tool](#)
[Subscription and Redemption Schedule](#)

PRODUCT

[Monthly Commentary \(Series A | July 2026\)](#)
[Monthly Commentary \(Series F | July 2026\)](#)
[Monthly Commentary \(Series A | June 2026\)](#)
[Monthly Commentary \(Series F | June 2026\)](#)
[Top Holding Case Studies](#)

ALPHA MANAGERS HEDGE FUND

MARKETING

[Web Page Overview](#)
[Press Release](#)
[Presentation \(Investor\)](#)
[Client Aid A](#)
[Client Aid B](#)

LEGAL

[Application for Subsequent Subscriptions](#)
[Subscription and Redemption Schedule](#)
[Subscription Agreement Tool \(Smart Form\)](#)

PRODUCT

[Monthly Commentary \(Series A | June 2026\)](#)
[Monthly Commentary \(Series F | June 2026\)](#)
[Monthly Commentary \(Series A | May 2026\)](#)
[Monthly Commentary \(Series F | May 2026\)](#)

ALTITUDE EQT GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FUND

MARKETING

[Web Page Overview](#)
[Press Release](#)
[Presentation \(Investor\)](#)
[Client Aid A](#)
[Client Aid B](#)

LEGAL

[Offering Memorandum](#)
[Application for Subsequent Subscriptions](#)
[Subscription Agreement](#)
[Subscription and Redemption Schedule](#)
[Subscription Agreement Tool \(Smart Form\)](#)

PRODUCT

[Monthly Commentary \(Series A | June 2026\)](#)
[Monthly Commentary \(Series F | June 2026\)](#)
[Monthly Commentary \(Series A | May 2026\)](#)
[Monthly Commentary \(Series F | May 2026\)](#)

BMO GAM's Alternatives distribution team



Guillaume Lagourgue
Managing Director and
Head of Alternatives
Distribution
guillaume.lagourgue@bmo.com
416-779-7205



Lillian Ferndrager
Director,
Alternatives Distribution
lillian.ferndrager@bmo.com
437-332-0734



Adam Abitbol
Director,
Alternatives Distribution
adam.abitbol@bmo.com
514-242-1702



Terry Chung
Vice President,
Product Management
& Client Engagement
Alternatives Distribution
terry.chung@bmo.com
437-871-1085



Adam Heagle
Vice President,
Alternatives Investor
Relations
adam.heagle@bmo.com
416-433-3248



Joseph Abinaked
Vice President,
Alternatives Distribution
joseph.abinaked@bmo.com
437-830-0757



Arvin Valencia
Vice President,
Institutional Coverage,
Alternatives Distribution
arvin.valencia@bmo.com
416-738-4858



Kylie Fung
Head of Strategy,
Alternatives Distribution
kylie.fung@bmo.com
416-706-7357



Sarah Banks
Senior Associate,
Alternatives
sarah1.banks@bmo.com
416-722-7608



Tamara Turner
Senior Associate,
Alternatives Distribution
Support
tamara.turner@bmo.com
416-909-9594